It’s that time of year when I pore over the latest annual accounts at Companies House of the UK’s largest estate agency groups. This year, one theme stands out above all others. Debt.
The days of low interest rates are over, so the question I keep asking as I read these accounts is simple. Which estate agency groups can genuinely afford to invest in the future of this industry, particularly with the advent of AI and the tech required to keep up, and which are simply servicing yesterday’s borrowing?
In this article I’ll be looking at those with seriously eye-watering numbers of debt – and my next article will focus on those who, by contrast, have performed well. The end of year accounts filed, reflecting different accounting years ending between March 2024 and April 2025, are compared with the previous year.
Chianti Holdings Limited (the holding company for the Lomond group) increased turnover by 43% to £116.6m in 2024. On the surface, that looks impressive. But if you dig deeper, you see the group reported a loss after tax of £32.1m, compared with a £21.2m loss the previous year.
Net liabilities sit at £(86.8)m. Cash on the balance sheet is £42.5m, yet total debt stands at £313.6m. That is not a typo. Over £313m!
Interest costs alone were £32.2m in 2024, up from £19.0m the year before. The operating business actually generated EBITDA of £21.5m, but it is swallowed whole by financing costs.
There were 14 acquisitions in 2024, taking the total since formation to 65, and between the balance sheet date and the accounts being signed, further acquisitions were made, including Kinleigh Folkard & Hayward and others for a combined £126m. The rumours of the high multiples that are being paid are starting to show in the balance sheets of all acquirers.
Now look at Hadrian Holding Limited, the ultimate holding company for the Leaders Romans Group. Revenue increased 24% to £258.9m. On the face of it, that’s strong growth. Managed properties rose by 13% to 73,585.
But the group reported a loss before tax of £67.1m, due primarily to interest expenditure of £49.4m. Net assets have moved from £29.0m in 2023 to net liabilities of £(17.6)m in 2024. Debt stands at £371.0m, up from £322.0m the previous year.
An incremental acquisition facility of £50m was added in 2024, taking total facilities to £125m, alongside a £15m share issue. Multiple acquisitions followed, including Stirling Ackroyd and others.
Again, the model is clear. Grow through acquisition, realise synergies, then cut costs. But with £371m of borrowings sitting on the balance sheet, the question I have is whether the capital structure is built for resilience.
Then we come to Strike Limited. Revenue rose to £31.1m from £13.2m following the acquisition of the Purplebricks’ trade and assets in May 2023. But the loss after tax widened from £19.2m to £37.8m.
Net liabilities are £57.3m, debt stands at £50.4m and post balance sheet, a further £29.7m additional loans from investors were drawn in addition to further share capital which had to be injected after March 2024 to support the business.
The audit opinion makes explicit reference to a material uncertainty in respect of going concern. Despite having secured shareholder support, will Strike survive?
Yopa Property Limited increased revenue 54% to £19.7m. Losses reduced slightly to £3.8m, though the results aren’t fully comparable year on year as the company shortened its accounting period in 2023 to nine months. Net liabilities more than doubled, to £(6.6)m, with debt of £5.7m.
The going concern position continues to rely on support from Daily Mail and General Trust PLC, its ultimate parent company. Improving ancillary revenue is clearly the strategy, but again, this is not internally funded growth. Will the parent company continue to give its support?
For all these agencies carrying a mountain of debt and paying millions a year in interest, surely their priority is survival and refinancing, not innovation and moving forward? This is not criticism. It’s arithmetic.
These latest accounts show a widening divide. On one side, we have highly leveraged acquisition platforms dependent on continual capital support. On the other, profitable operators with strong balance sheets, which I’ll report on in my next article.
The question for 2026 is simple. Who is building for the long term – and who is just keeping the lenders happy?
Paul Smith is the founder and chairman of Spicerhaart.